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Tackling the problem of ecosystem services degradation is an important policy 
challenge.  Different types of economic instruments have been employed by conservation 
agencies to meet this challenge. Notable among them are Payment for Ecosystem Services 
(PES) schemes that pay private landowners to change land uses to pro-environmental ones on 
their properties. This paper focuses on a PES scheme – an auction for the cost-efficient 
disbursal of government funds for selection of spatially contiguous land management 
projects. The auction is structured as an iterative descending price auction where every bid is 
evaluated on the basis of a scoring metric – a benefit cost ratio. The ecological effectiveness 
and economic efficiency of the auction is tested with data generated from lab experiments. 
These experiments use the information available to the subjects about the spatial goal as the 
treatment variable. Analysis indicates that the information reduces the cost-efficiency of the 
auction. Experience with bidding also has a negative impact on auction efficiency. The study 
also provides an analysis of the behavior of winners and losers at the final auction outcome. 
Winners and losers are found to have significantly different behavior with winners bidding 





















  Tackling the problem of ecosystem and ecosystem services (ES) degradation, is one 
of the foremost policy challenges at the global level today. Public and private sector 
initiatives to protect and restore ecosystems are now found around the globe. This paper 
focuses on public sector schemes that involve changing land use and land management 
patterns on private working landscapes where most of the degraded ecosystems are located. 
For example the US General Accounting Office reported in 1994 that 90% of all species 
listed as endangered in the United States is located on private lands (GAO 1994). Similarly, 
in Australia 99% of all endangered ecosystems and 97% of all concerned ecosystems are 
located on private land (Rolfe et al. 2009). Different types of economic instruments have 
been employed by conservation agencies to protect these ecosystems. Notable among them 
are Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes that pay landowners to change land uses 
to pro-environmental ones on their properties.    
 
  A key challenge for these schemes is that they are constrained by budget limitations 
indicating that funds need to be spent in a way to maximize the conservation impact. This 
economic efficiency objective has lead to an interest in auction based PES schemes. The 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the US(Kirwan et al. 2005) and the Australian Land 
Recovery Program are examples of PES schemes which use auction based incentives. In the 
US, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) runs conservation auctions (CA) 
separately in the 50 states at various times during the year. The CRP is the earliest CA for 
procurement of conservation benefits. It has to date disbursed $26 billion (Kirwan et al. 2005) 
to preserve nearly 1.8 million acres of wetlands and retire nearly 36.8 million acres of 
farmland and reduce soil erosion. Classen et al. (2001) estimates a loss of nearly 220 million 
tons of soil erosion per year if the CRP is terminated. Most of the CRP land is found in the 
Northern Great Plains, Prairie Gateway and the Heartland (USDA).  In the CRP, landowners 
submit bids indicating what compensation they would accept to enroll lands into the program. 
This period of bid submission is termed a signup. Once the bids are in, the CRP that evaluates 
all submitted bids on the basis of a benefit-cost scoring metric termed the Environmental 
Benefit Index (EBI). The structure of the CRP has been adopted by conservation agencies in 
Australia under the Bush Tender pilot trials (Stoneham et al. 2003) and the Auction for 
Landscape Recovery pilot (Gole et al. 2005).  These auctions trials used a similar index – the 
Biodiversity Benefit Index (BBI) and the EBI respectively to evaluate bids.  
  
  Conservation auctions have however focused on maximizing the area of land in the 
scheme by increasing participation without regard for the location of the projects on the 
landscape. This participation based targeting Yet the spatial objective is imperative for the 
achievement of various ecological and ecosystem preserving functions. Long term provision 
of most ES such as maintenance of water quality and temperature, a check on soil erosion and 
survival of endangered species depends upon the spatial pattern of land uses. For example 
creation of spatially contiguous areas of riparian buffers have a far greater effect on checking 
soil erosion and nutrient runoff than if there are gaps between buffered tracts. It is also 
universally believed that habitat fragmentation is not conducive to species conservation. 
Negative impacts of lack of spatial patterns are also substantiated by theories on 
metapopulation dynamics and community complementarity across adjacent habitats (Levins 
1969, Gilpin, 1987, Vane-Wright et al., 1991, Faith, 1994). Bockstael (1996) presents that it 
not just the total forested land in a region that matters for species abundance and diversity, 
but its size, shape and the conflicting land uses found along its edges.  
  
 
  Based on this spatial criterion, it is necessary to consider the design of an auction that 
explicitly targets the selection of spatially adjacent bids. The experimental studies by Rolfe et 
al. (2005) and Reeson et al. (2008) have considered a CA addressing this spatial 
agglomeration issue. These studies evaluate the performance of auctions for the creation of 
landscape corridors and linkages between core areas of habitat. Rolfe et al. consider 
Artefactual field experiments with actual landowners using both sealed bid and iterative 
auction formats. These individuals submit bids for the creation of various spatial patterns on a 
simulated landscape. Various types of scoring metrics sensitive to multiple spatial objectives 
are considered. The iterative format considers limited information feedback about auction 
results. Here, landowners are able to view the location of the winners on the landscape at the 
end of every round. This information allows them to revise bids in the next iteration if they 
have not won in the current one. The chief result of these experiments is that the iterative 
auction format leads to spatial patterns more cost efficiently than the sealed bid format. 
Under the sealed bid format subjects are permitted to communicate and submit bids for their 
management projects. Communication however intensifies rent seeking reducing the amount 
of conservation benefits procured.  
 
  Reeson et al. address the corridor creation goal in controlled laboratory settings. They 
also consider an iterative auction with limited information feedback about auction results at 
the end of each round. The feedback information includes knowledge about winners on the 
experimental landscape.  The auction experiments provide insightful results about: 1) the 
impact of knowledge of total number of rounds and 2) the possibility of improving bids 
submitted across multiple rounds on rent seeking in the CA’s ability to create spatial patterns.  
The efficiency of the auction in terms of rent seeking is found to be significantly higher when 
number of rounds is unknown and when subjects don’t have the ability to revise bids in the 
next rounds. Rent seeking is also mitigated when provisional winners in a round are unable to 
submit bids in future rounds. Given this literature, enhanced understanding of CA for spatial 
coordination will benefit from design variations which: 1) involve iterative auctions
1 with full 
information feedback about auction results and 2) which consider the impact of knowledge of 
the auctioneer’s spatial objective on auction performance.  
 
  This study presents the structure of an iterative descending-price auction, that 
explicitly includes the spatial objective into the selection criterion in the presence of a limited 
fixed budget. Variation in auction design is brought about by the inclusion of a full 
information feedback mechanism about auction results across multiple rounds of the CA. The 
feedback information includes both the magnitude and location of all bids submitted in an 
auction round. The reason for considering this particular feedback format is two-fold. From 
the perspective of conservation policy, a full feedback auction approximates real life 
scenarios where it is always possible for participating farmers within a region to know which 
farmers were selected and how much money they received. Moreover, given the spatial goal, 
knowledge about others’ bids and location of winners may also improve the performance of 
the auction. From an economic perspective, full information feedback is of interest as it 
affords the study of a new auction design that has not been considered in the context of CAs. 
In this study, experimental sessions vary the information available (about the spatial 
objective) to subjects as a treatment. This permits analysis of how information impacts 
auction efficiency and individual behavior.    
                                                      
1 The interest in an iterative format is underscored by cost-savings of nearly $820,000 in Fiscal Year 2006 
(USDA) with a pilot two round iterative format under the Wetland Reserve Program by the USDA.  
 
The Conservation Auction Model  
Let     1 , 2 ,…     be the set of N participants in the auction. Each participant has one 
project/property. The submit bids which represent the amount of financial compensation 
bidders are willing to accept for conservation land uses on their property. For simplicity let 
every bidder submit a single bid only so that the total number of bids is equal to the number 
of participants.  Let        ,….     represent a vector of submitted bids.  The auction is a 
discriminatory price auction where every winning bidder is paid the value of the bid 
submitted at the end of the auction. Let  ∈  0 , 1     be the vector defining an allocation 
representing the set of winning and losing bidders in the auction. Every element     1  in the 
vector x represents a bidder   who has been accepted to partake in the conservation activity 
and an element     0  represents bidder    who has been rejected  
 
Let the  auctioneer have information about both the intrinsic ecological benefits from 
conservation land uses on the N properties and the benefits generated when any two spatially 
adjacent properties are placed in the conservation program. Let the intrinsic benefits be 
represented by the vector         …    . Let matrix B be a       matrix where each 
element   ,   represents the agglomeration benefit from selecting bids for the i
th and j
th 
parcels. All diagonal elements of the matrix are zero since a project is not its own neighbor 
and there are no agglomeration benefits from selection of the same. Also if any off-diagonal 
element   ,   is zero, it indicates that the projects i and  j are not contiguous to each other or 
there is no environmental benefit from accepting these projects into the program. In order to 
count the benefits from contiguous participation only once in the value function, matrix B is 
assumed to be a triangular matrix. The value of the elements in matrix B depends upon the 
spatial configuration of the projects on the landscape.
2 Let the general form of the 
auctioneer’s value function when spatial patterns matter be represented as  
 
                                                         ′    ′                                                     (1) 
 
  The first term in (1) is the total intrinsic benefits from conservation land uses on the 
properties selected in the auction and the second term represents the benefits from selecting 
adjacent projects. For this study the agglomeration benefit from parcels is assumed to be 
identical and represented by a factord . The general form of the environmental value function 
(1) for the linear configuration is represented as 
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2Two examples of spatial configurations include linear and circular configurations. A linear configuration is 
appropriate for a landscape with properties  arranged linearly  such as along a stream. Here all except the 
properties at the extremities of the stream or at the edge of the jurisdiction of the program agency have two 
neighbors. Additionally, the neighbors of any given property cannot be neighbors of each other. A conservation 
project on this linear landscape may constitute riparian buffer creation along the length of the stream for 
reduction of nutrient runoff, regulation of water temperature and storm water flow. The Conservation Reserve 
Enhancement Program in Oregon makes payments to farms for creation of such buffers. The circular 
configuration is a simplistic representation of landscapes where the identity of neighbors for every property is 
different.  This is a general type of a landscape where connected land uses can improve nesting and foraging 
habitat for birds, natural pollinators like bees etc.    
 
The expression for the value function for the circular configuration is     
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The Auctioneer’s Problem 
  The CA in the study is a descending price scoring auction with     1,2,…..  
iterations/rounds where T is the maximum possible rounds. In each round bidders submit a 
single bid. The auctioneer selects the winning allocation   
∗ for that round on the basis of a 
scoring metric that has a benefit cost format. The   
∗ is the provisionally winning allocation 
for round t.  This optimization problem to select the set of projects   
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  In the presence of the budget constraint and costs and benefits associated with every 
property, the current optimization takes the form of a knapsack problem.  Here a greedy 
algorithm is used to obtain the solution that maximizes the value of the objective function.  
This  algorithm is a local optima generating algorithm. It starts with an initial set of winning 
bidders (who are associated with particular projects) and replaces them with other non-
selected objects until an allocation   
∗ is reached that maximizes the value function.  
 
  The structure of the optimization problem is such that the objective of spatially 
contiguous bid selection is incorporated into the winner determination exercise.  Bids for 
spatially adjacent projects receive a higher score owing to the presence of the factor   and 
hence have a higher chance of being selected.
3 Once the provisionally winning allocation    
∗ 
is determined it is announced to the bidders and the auction proceeds to round    1   where 
the process is repeated and provisionally winning allocation       
∗ is determined. This process 
is repeated until the stopping rule is satisfied. For the current auction the rules involve   
 
1.   ̅       where  ̅ represents the minimum number of rounds.  
2.      
∗          
∗   ∀      
 
  Condition 1 indicates that the auction has to go through a minimum of  ̅ iterations 
prior to ending. The minimum rounds ensure that bidders gain familiarity with bidding in the 
auction. The second condition implies that for a round   to be final the winning score from 
selecting the projects in round    1   should be the same as the score generated from 
selecting the projects in round t.   If for any round  ̅       both conditions I and II hold 
then the auction ends.  Else the auction repeats through T rounds and ends automatically.  
 
                                                      
3 The reason for the benefit-cost ratio formulation is that policies implementing CA adopt this benefit-cost ratio 
method, to select projects. For example the EBI used by the CRP is a benefit-cost ratio score. The use of this 
score for project selection in the CA is termed benefit-cost targeting (Classen et al. year).  
 
  In the current auction the activity rule
4 is implicit within the auction procedure.  In 
every round  bids from the past round are automatically submitted  and are restricted to be 
less than or equal to the past round bids. In this setting subjects are always compelled to bid 
rather than wait as if a subject waits then their bid for that round is zero. Since bids are 
restricted to be positive, and are decreasing between rounds, they cannot improve on their 
zero bids in the next round and essentially lose the opportunity to participate in the auction.  
Features of a stable auction allocation 
Given the presence of the budget constraint, the total number of projects selected is 
endogenously determined within the auction. Furthermore it is difficult to determine the 
nature of the strategic interactions between bidders except those which are dictated by the 
auction format (involving reduction of bids across rounds). Thus determination of an 
expression for a Nash Equilibrium outcome is hard. As a second-best option we characterize 
the features of an allocation that is obtained in the last round of an auction on the basis of a 
stability criterion. Stability here is defined in terms of behavior of winners and losers at the 
final allocation.  
 
  For the losers, at the stable allocation, bids are equal to costs so that it is not in their 
interest to reduce their bids to improve their likelihood of winning.  
  For the winners, their bids are greater than or equal to costs so that rents are non-
negative. However they don't have any incentive to submit higher bids to earn more 
rents as that will remove them from the winning allocation.  
Experimental Design      
The Information Content of the Auctions 
  The iterative auction in the study considers full information feedback about auction 
results in all sessions. At the beginning of the auction, every subject knows their own cost 
and the value of the budget to be spent. As part of the full information feedback, at the end of 
every auction round, the information about the identity of winners, the value of the subjects’ 
scores, and the value of all bids submitted are provided to every subject.  
 
  In this setting we analyze the ecological and economic performance of the mechanism 
when subjects have knowledge about the spatial objective of the auctioneer. Rolfe et al. have 
considered artefactual field experiments where they inform participants about the scoring 
                                                      
4 In iterative auctions, often participants may not bid in the early rounds of the auction. They may instead prefer 
to observe the outcome at the end of the first few rounds and obtain information about winners and their bids (if 
revealed). On the basis of this information they can submit bids in future rounds. Such waiting prolongs the 
auction and provides waiting bidders an opportunity to game the auction. An activity rule in the iterative auction 
prevents such waiting and gaming by forcing all bidders to bid in a round to be able to bid in subsequent rounds. 
Activity rules are have been used in the FCC auctions (Plott 1997), and airwaves auctions (McAfee and 
McMillan 1996).  
 
metric. They however don’t assess how this information impacts auction performance. Cason 
et al. have considered a similar information treatment in the context of an iterative 
conservation auction. In their study, under the between-information treatment subjects are 
provided information about the environmental values of their projects in the treatment 
sessions. This information is found to reduce both ecological and economic performance of 
the auction. In the current study, we introduce extra information in the treatment sessions to 
analyze both performance and individual level behavior in the auction.  
 
  In this study information about the spatial objective is provided by informing bidders 
about the format and components of the scoring metric at the beginning of the auction in 6 
sessions. These treatment sessions are termed SCORE sessions. In the six baseline NO-
SCORE sessions this information is not revealed.  The scoring metric has a benefit cost ratio 
format. The benefit from a project is a sum of its  intrinsic environmental benefit and the 
benefit from spatial contiguity. The benefit from spatial contiguity depends upon the number 
of winning neighbors. If the knapsack algorithm selects a project along with its neighbors, 
then the scores of the projects are higher than if the neighbors are not chosen. This is seen 
from the format of the metric as represented below.  Higher the value of the metric, greater is 
the likelihood of selection.  
        




Auction Performance Metrics 
In order to assess auction performance, we consider the allocation chosen in the 
absence of asymmetric information when bids submitted equal cost as the point of reference. 
Let this allocation be denoted by     . Given this reference point, we can evaluate the 
economic and ecological performance of the auction at any stable final allocation  ∗ relative 
to     .   Three different metrics are used to analyze the economic efficiency, 
competitiveness and ecological effectiveness of the auction. The ecological effectiveness 
(EE) of the auction at the stable allocation  ∗ is measured as the ratio of environmental 
benefits from  ∗  and      . Thus using expression (1) we have 
 
    ∗;       
   ∗ 
       
 
 
 The value of EE indicates the impact of asymmetric information on ecological 
performance.  Closer the value of EE to 1, better is the capacity of the auction to deliver ES 
relative to the full information outcome.  A value of 1 (when  ∗         is also possible 
when bids are not submitted at cost. However although ecologically effective the same 
allocation requires more outlay indicating a lower economic efficiency and more expensive 
conservation procurement. The EE metric cannot pick up the effect and we need a metric for 
economic efficiency.   
 
In measuring economic cost efficiency, we consider the actual outlay in the auction 
relative to the outlays at      . Economic cost efficiency (CE) is measured as a ratio of two 
ratios. The numerator ratio represents environmental benefit from the stable allocation  ∗  
 
relative to the total outlay associated with it. The denominator is the corresponding benefit 
outlay ratio for      . Thus CE can be represented by the following metric where    is the 
cost of project  .   
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For any  set of cost and benefit parameters which determines     , higher is rent 
seeking, lower is the value of CE Greater cost efficiency of the auction is associated with 
higher values of CE. A value of CE equal to 1 indicates that bids submitted equal costs. The 
CE metric picks up the effect of the unspent budgets left over after winners are paid in the 
auction. This is important as the money left over can have some alternative uses.
5  
 
Finally on the side of the bidders, the Information Rents or seller profits within a 
session are calculated as the sum of the difference between winning bids and costs for all 
agents. Rents measure the total money in excess of costs paid by the auctioneer to procure a 
set of projects and represents the “money left on the table”. This metric also captures the 
degree of competitiveness of the auction since competition between bidders across multiple 
rounds is expected to reduce the value of submitted bids and final rents. It is represented as 
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These performance metrics can be employed to analyze auction performance under 
various performance regimes. These scenarios are represented with the help of the projects’ 
cost and benefits in the next section.  
Choice of Experimental Parameters in the Auction 
  in this study, we chose auction parameters for the experiments on the basis of the 
features of the stable allocation and     . the main goal of this choice exercise is to generate 
parameters which give rise to different performance levels at candidate stable allocations. 
This choice is also made such that groups of players at various locations on the experimental 
landscape have variable likelihood of selection. Four sets of parameters are considered for the 
twelve periods for the 6 auction participants arranged around a circle in the experiment. Let 




                                                      
5 One caveat in the interpretation of the CE metric is that owing to the budget constraint, a situation may arise 
where very little conservation is purchased and a lot of the budget is left over after paying off the bidders since 
the bids submitted by losing bidders are very high. In this case, the value of the CE can be greater than 1. This 
scenario represents a highly inefficient outcome.   
 
  In addition to different potential values of the performance metrics at the candidate 
stable solutions the following should also be true.  
 
1)  The      for each parameter set corresponds to a different number of projects. 
Thus for G1, G3 and G4 the auction selects four out of the six projects. In case of 
G2, three projects can be selected. 
2)  Considering the      under every regime, the auction produces different spatial 
configurations. Under G1 and G4, four adjacent projects can make up the stable 
solution. With set G2, of the three selected projects only two are adjacent to each 
other and under regime G3 three of the four selected projects can be adjacent to 
each other.  
  
  The total value of the budget is the same for all periods and is equal to 350 
experimental dollars. The value of environmental benefit from selecting any two adjacent 
projects on the spatial grid is 50. Table 1 represents the parameters used for the experiment.  
  
   
 
Project pivotalness  
 
  Since spatial patterns matter, the cost & benefit associated with the project, and its 
location on the landscape relative to their neighbors determines its own chances and its 
neighbors' chances of being selected. We know that once the bids are submitted, projects are 
evaluated with a score that is dependent on the number of selected neighbors as well.   Thus 
if projects have low costs and high benefits and are adjacent to other low cost and high 
benefit projects, they have a greater likelihood of being accepted in the auction than when 
they are surrounded by one or both high cost (high or low benefit) projects. Similarly, the low 
cost and high benefit projects themselves improve their neighbors' chances of winning as they 
have a higher chance of acceptance owing to their intrinsic high values and low costs. Thus in 
the current auction given the nature of the scoring metric, there is reciprocity between a 
project and its neighbors with each generating an externality for the other on the basis of 
which their chances of being selected in the auction are impacted.  Projects adjacent to each 
other have varying degrees of influence on their own and their neighbors' chances and can be 
considered to be pivotal to the selection of a combination of spatially adjacent projects. 
Moreover a project's capacity to be pivotal increases if they are adjacent to projects with low 
costs and high benefits than to those with higher ones. Thus in the current study a project can 
contribute different degrees of benefits depending upon which spatial combination it is a part 
of. This feature sets apart the CA in this study from those presented in the earlier research 
such as that by Cason et al. (2003), Reeson et al. (2007). 
 
  In the present setting, whether a project is pivotal or not can be determined by 
evaluating the degree to which the value of the objective function (sum of benefit per unit 
cost across selected projects) drops if that project is no longer included in the CA. Greater the 
fall in the value of the objective function, greater is the pivotalness of the project. For 
example, if bidders submit bids equal to costs for set G4, the value of the objective function 
from selecting projects 2, 3, 4 and 5 is 17.91. Now if project 4 with cost of 69 and benefit of 
277 is removed from the auction, then projects 1, 2, and 3 are selected as they maximize the 
value of (4). As a result the value of the objective function drops by 6.64. This value drop is 
higher than the drop of 6.55 obtained if project 3 (with benefits equal to 235 and cost equal to 
51) and not 4 is excluded from the allocation. Thus project 4 is more pivotal than project 3 in  
 
    . Of special interest is the fact that project 4 is more pivotal than project 3 despite having 
a higher cost. This is because it has a higher benefit and is in a location where it is flanked by 
two low cost neighbors (project 5 with a cost of 87 and project 3 which have a higher 
likelihood of selection as well) compared to project 3 which is adjacent to project 4 and 
project 2 which has a high cost of 137 and a lower benefit. Here Project 3 is ranked second in 
pivotalness owing to its low cost and because it improves chances of selection of both its 
neighbors. Since Projects 2 and 5 are at the edge of      they don't contribute a large amount 
to the environmental benefit of the allocation and hence have a low pivotal rank. Hence, it is 
evident that besides own costs and benefits, the location of a project relative to neighbors 
plays a role in determining whether it has a greater likelihood of selection and accordingly 
whether it improves its adjacent projects' selection chances as well. This feature is utilized to 
choose parameters for the auction in a way that bidders holding projects at different points on 
the landscape have varying degrees of influence for their own and their neighbors' selection.  
Also regardless of location, since the score is a benefit cost ratio, projects at isolated positions 
may be accepted in the auction if their benefits are high enough and/or cost is low enough 
and also if money left over from the budget permits the selection of isolated projects. This is 
true for G2 where the two adjacent projects 3 and 4 along with the isolated project 6 
constitute      since project 6 has a very high benefit of 349 compared to projects 5 or 2 
which have benefits of 204 and 295 respectively. Finally, in the current auction environment, 
it may be expected, that players with pivotal projects will be able to exploit this comparative 
advantage to try to earn higher rents if they are selected in the auction. Table 2 represents the 
degree of pivotalness of each of the projects comprising      for G1, G2, G3 and G4. It 
presents the value of the change in the objective function from the removal of a project and 
the movement to another allocation and the pivotal rank of different projects For both G1 and 
G2, the lowest cost project is most pivotal and is at the centre of other selected projects (G1) 
or has at least one neighbor (G2). For G3 and G4, while the pivotal projects don't have the 
lowest cost they rank very high on the benefit scale (G4).  
 
  Once the parameter selections are made on the basis of the pivotalness of projects and 
potential auction performance at a stable allocation, they are assigned to the 12 periods of the 
auction experiment. In doing this,  it is ensured that if everyone places bids equal to their 
cost, every bidder wins three times across the twelve periods.  Also these parameter values 
are assigned to different periods on an ad-hoc basis to eliminate order effects across this 
within treatment. Finally at the beginning of every auction session a training period is 
conducted in order to demonstrate to the participants how the auction works. For this period, 
a different set of numbers is selected on an ad-hoc basis.  
Description of Experimental Procedure 
All participants were randomly selected from the Penn State student population. The 
sessions lasted between an hour and an hour and half. Subjects were paid a show-up payment 
of $7 and the money they earned during the experiment. The exchange rate to convert 
experimental dollars to actual dollars was 15 experimental dollars per real dollar. Neutral 
terminology was used during the experiments and the use of economic jargon was minimized. 
The term QUALITY was used to refer to the environmental value and the term ITEM was 
used to denote a land management project.   
 
   
 
Budget – $350 
Environmental Benefit from Two Adjacent Projects – 
50 
 
Periods in which used 
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Table  1: Parameters for Experiments  
 
Set Winning  Project  Change in Value of Objective 
Function  Pivotal Rank 
G1 
3 0.2  IV 
4 1  II 
5 6.36  I 
6 0.86  III 
G2 
3 1.12  I 
4 0.07  III 
6 0.36  II 
G3 
1 3.17  II 
2 3.17  II 
3 4.57  I 
5 2.41  III 
G4 
2 0.24  IV 
3 6.55  II 
4 6.64  I 
5 3  III 
Table  2: Pivotalness of Winning Projects by Parameter Regime 
 
  Treatment 
  SCORE NO-SCORE 
Number of sessions  6 6 
Number of players in a session  6   6  
Number of periods per session  13 (one practice period)  13 (one practice period) 
Maximum number of rounds  10 10 
Minimum number of rounds 
played  5 5 
Payment structure  $7 show up fee 
Exchange rate – 15 experimental dollars for every US $ 
Table 3 Experimental Design 
 
Twelve experimental sessions (6 each for SCORE and NO-SCORE) were conducted. 
Every session had 6 players.
6 Players in a session interacted in the lab through software 
                                                      
6 The terms players, subjects, participants have the same meaning.  
 
interface programmed in Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
7  The iterative auction was run for 13 
periods with the first period being a practice non-paying period. Every period (except the 
practice period) had a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 10 rounds. After all players had 
submitted bids in a round, the computer displayed a results screen showing the submitted bids 
and the identity of provisional winners. In addition, all players saw their own score for the 
current round, their bids from the current and past rounds, their costs figures and the number 
of neighbors selected in the current round. The cost and bid from past round were visible to 
the subjects whenever they submitted a bid. The bids submitted in any round were restricted 
to be always above the costs. The bid from a past round was automatically submitted in the 
next round by Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects could however decrease bid value by a 
minimum decrement of 50 cents (experimental). The provisional winners in a round became 
final winners of a period if the stopping rule was satisfied.
8 During a session, the identity and 
location of players on the circular landscape remained unchanged.  
Results  
The results in this study can be divided into two categories. The first part deals with 
market performance analysis. The second deals with the analysis of subject markups from the 
final round (binding round) of every period. Markup analysis provides an idea about the 
behavior of participants at the stable solution of the auction.  
Analysis of Market Performance 
Data from the final round of every auction period is used for market performance 
analysis.
9 This is because the final round is the binding round and determines the outcome of 
the auction in any period. For the purpose of regression analysis the dependent variable is the 
value of the performance metric for the final round of a period. The set of independent 
variables includes the following. For both the models the Information (treatment) dummy, the 
Period and Round variable and parameter dummies representing different cost benefit 
regimes, are included. The constant term represents the effect of the omitted parameter 
category and the NO-SCORE sessions. The Period variable captures the impact of experience 
with bidding on auction performance. Similarly the Round variable is included to control for 
performance of the auction within a period. In the analysis both period and round variables 
are considered in log formats so that estimated coefficients can have growth rate and 
elasticity interpretations. 
   
  In the estimation of market performance metrics, we consider a random effects Tobit 
specification for analysis of EE since its value cannot exceed 1. For the CE metric, a simple 
random effects specification is used since as mentioned it can have a value exceeding 1.  A 
                                                      
7 The instructions for the experiments are available on request. 
8 Henceforth selection of bids or projects or participants will have identical meaning. 
9 Data is recorded for all the 12 periods of all the NO-SCORE sessions and 3 SCORE sessions. For the 
remaining 3 SCORE sessions, the last period is lost owing to software error. Also in some periods, the stopping 
rule is violated owing to a glitch in program. Here the stopping rule is forcefully applied to end the auction and 
data from subsequent rounds are eliminated.  
  
 
summary of the data reveals that this is in fact true as there is one observation for which the 
value of CE is at 1.02 and of the total experimental budget of 350 experimental dollars, only 
243 is spent. Finally, for the information rents regression a log form for rents is used as the 
dependent variable in a random effects regression model. The log specification provides 
elasticity interpretations for the estimates.  
 
Table 4 presents the regression results for the three metrics. The value of estimates 
indicate that in an iterative auction with full information feedback, the significant impact of 
increased information content is only felt on the economic efficiency of the mechanism; the 
total conservation purchased is not significantly different. The signs of the estimate indicate 
that in the presence of information about the scoring metric, the average economic efficiency 
is significantly lower (at 5% level). This reduction in cost efficiency means that given the 
budget all purchased conservation units are more expensive in the presence of information 
about the spatial goal. The significant estimate (at 5%) for the dummy in the rents regression 
implies that when subjects know the spatial objective, they successfully exploit their 
combined locational and cost advantages to submit and earn higher rents (on winning). 
Figures 1 – 3 provide visual proofs of these results.  Comparing between treatments, the 
value of CE is greater for all SCORE sessions except in two periods (5 and 12). Again, in 
Figure 2 the plot of average markups per session in SCORE sessions is greater than those in 
NO-SCORE. Finally no significant difference in the percentage ecological benefits is 
observed across treatments for multiple periods in Figure 3.  
 
The nature of the impact of experience in the auction is captured by the Period 
variable. The estimate for the log of Period is significant at 5% for the CE and at 1% in the 
rents and significant at 10% in the EE regression. The negative sign of the estimate in the CE 
and EE models indicates that with increasing experience and familiarity with the CA, the 
performance of the mechanism suffers. This adverse impact of experience has significance 
for actual policy implementation. Government run CAs are implemented multiple times 
during a year as well as over a period of many years. Here farmers' repeated participation in 
the mechanism increases familiarity and promotes learning about the structure of the scheme 
that can enable them to submit bids that are much higher than costs and earn high rents. A 
real policy based example of this phenomenon is the increase in bids submitted in CRP 
signups in the past (Kirwan et al. 2005). Submission of high bids over time is also 
represented in the current model by the positive and significant (at 1%) estimate for Log of 
Period in the rents regression and the positive trend in the markup graph presented in Figure 
2.  The inelastic nature of the impact can be attributed to the iterative format. Within a period 
bidding takes place in multiple rounds where successively lower bids are submitted.  
 
  So even if higher rents are earned over time, reduction in bids within a period reduces 
the magnitude of this experience induced rent seeking. Finally, pertinent to the current study 
is the impact of experience on ecological effectiveness of the mechanism. The estimate is 
significant at 10% and negative indicating that regardless of the quantity of information 
available to a group of people, with full information feedback conservation units get more 
expensive over time so that fewer units can be purchased with the funds available.  
 
The log of Round is significant at 10% level of significance in the CE model and at 
1% for the rents and EE models.  The sign of the estimate is negative for the rents regression 
and positive for the other two. The sign of the estimate in the three regressions is a 
consequence of the iterative format under which bids submitted are decreasing over multiple 
rounds. In addition, the elasticity estimate in the rents regression is less than one indicating  
 
that within a period, bidders always try to retain as much rent as possible as they reduce the 
value of bids submitted from one round to the other.  This result is true regardless of the 
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*** represents significance at 10% level of significance 
** represents significance at 5% level of significance 
*represents significance at 1% level of significance 









Figure 5-1 Average Cost Efficiency by Period 
 
 
Figure 5-2 Average Markup by Periods 
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G1 36  0.757  0.09 0.55 0.92  1 
G2 36  0.903  0.12 0.59  1  1 
G3 36  0.8  0.08 0.58 0.94  0.84 




G1 36  0.819  0.05 0.63 0.91  0.9 
G2 36  0.844  0.07 0.68 0.94  0.78 
G3 36  0.812  0.08 0.66 0.96  0.8 




G1 36  52.12  27.56  7  160.5  35 
G2 36  44.34  18.85  17.5  111  33 
G3 36  59.54  15.65 33  101  35 
G4 33 101.57 25.26 36  141  101 
Table 5: Summary of Performance Metrics in Auction by Parameter Group 
 
 
    
  In the current research the parameter dummies represent a secondary within treatment 
that every subject is exposed to. For the analysis of market performance parameters are 
chosen on the basis of expected performance levels and pivotalness of projects in      at a 
potential stable allocation in the auction. Table 6 provides a summary of the performance 
metrics by parameter regimes along with metric values for the candidate stable solution that 
served as the reference point for the parameter choices. Relative to the value of the metrics at 
the stable allocation used to choose the parameter values, their mean values attained in the 
auction is different. This indicates that subjects are able to exploit the private information 
they have and their location characteristics to earn higher rents. This higher rent seeking as 
mentioned makes every unit of conservation benefit dearer. In the regression, G4 is 
considered to be the omitted category as the total information rents that can be earned by 
winners at a candidate/potential stable solution is the highest under G4. In addition, the 
expected EE at this stable solution is the lowest as well.  Now considering the results in both 
Tables 4 and 5, the estimates for G2 and G3 are significantly different from zero implying  
 
that environmental performance under these regimes are significantly different from G4. The 
positive estimate indicates that environmental performance of the auction in these regimes is 
significantly higher relative to G4. One outcome of interest is that while an allocation with an 
EE value of 1 can be supported as the stable solution in the auction under G1 and G2, the 
mean EE value under G1 never reaches 1. In fact the mean EE under G1 is very near the 
same obtained in G4 (Table 5) which is 0.75. Thus relative to G4, there is a very high degree 
of rent seeking in the periods under G1 that causes the EE to plummet. This high degree of 
rent seeking reduces the difference in CE across parameter groups. This is seen from the 
mean values of the metrics in the summary Table 5 and the lack of significance for the G1, 
G2 and G3 estimates in the CE regression. Rent seeking also causes significant differences in 
performance between regimes in the rents regression as evident from the significant and 
positive estimates in the log of total rents regression. All the estimates are positive and 
significant indicating that rent seeking tendencies of all regimes are significantly different 
from that under G4. The negative sign of the estimates indicate that relative to G4, under all 
other regimes there is significantly less money left under the table. These signs and 
magnitudes of the parameter estimates indicate that auction performance is sensitive to 
parameter choices. In the context of actual policy based CA, a significant impact indicates 
that the performance of the CA will vary with the variation in the costs and benefits of 
conservation land uses and where they are located on the different working landscapes.  
Analysis of Bidding Behavior in the Auction  
  The parameters are chosen on the basis of the properties of the stable allocation 
relative to     . In order to statistically assess whether the behavior of winners and losers at 
the end of an auction period, corresponds to this theoretically stable allocation, we consider a 
regression with the value of average markup of bid over costs for every bidder in the final 
round of all the periods as the dependent variable. The markup is the differences between 
bids submitted and costs as a ratio of the bidders’ cost. Regression results provide insight 
about the variables that explain how close or far bidders’ bids are from costs when the 
auction ends. We expect that for a winner this markup will be higher than costs and for losers 
it will be lower and very near to zero or equal to it. Near zero markups also indicate high 
levels of competition between players. A total of 846 observations for 72 subjects are used 
for this analysis.  The set of independent variables include the Information Dummy, the 
reciprocal of the period variable that represents inter-temporal learning at the individual level, 
the Final Round variable and the parameter dummies G1, G2 and G3. Finally a dummy is 
included to capture the winning or losing status of a player in any period. Let this variable be 
termed Winner. we use the value of the winner variable from the penultimate round to 
instrument for the winning status in the current period.  
 
  Typically Winner would represent the status of a player in the final round of a period. 
However this will give rise to the problem of endogeneity. This is because bids (and hence 
markups) determine the winning or losing status of a player. Thus higher the bids lower the 
likelihood of selection. However in keeping with the theoretical properties of a stable  
solution, for a winner, the markup should be different from zero while for a loser the markup 
should be at zero. Given this problem of endogeneity, the status of a player from the past 
round is used as an instrument for the Winner dummy. The correlation coefficient between 
the Winner variable for the final round and the penultimate round in a period is 
approximately 0.82 justifying the use of this instrument.  
 
 
  Table 5 represents the set of estimated coefficients for this model. The positive and 
significant constant term (at 1%) indicates markups for all subjects are significantly different 
from zero at the end of the auction. In addition, the Information Dummy is positive and 
significant (at 5% level) indicating that extra information in SCORE sessions allows bidders 
to earn higher markups than in NO-SCORE sessions. 
 
  The estimates for G1, G2 and G3 are all negative and significantly different from the 
constant term that picks up the effect of set G4.  At the potential stable solution used to 
choose the values of the parameters, the total rents that winners could expect to earn was the 
highest under G4 relative to other regimes. Thus the negative sign of the estimates for each of 
G1, G2 and G3 indicate that the markups earned by players are less and they are closer to 
costs under these regimes. This result in turn is in keeping with the final stable solution of the 
auction.    
 
  Of special interest to the study of markup behavior are the estimates for the Lag 
Winner. The positive and significant estimate for the Lag Winner variable (at 1%) indicates 
that winning bidders’ markups at the end of the auction are higher than losing bidders’ 
values. This outcome is in line with the properties of bids of winners and losers at a stable 
solution of the auction. However, the interaction term between Winner and the Information 
Dummy is not significant. Thus, the entire impact of information on markups in SCORE is 
captured by a level shift represented by the significant and positive dummy estimate. Having 
this extra information in SCORE sessions does not influence how winners demand higher 
markups.  
 
  The estimate for Learning is negative and significant (at 5%) indicating that in latter 
periods, by which time, agents are familiar and have learnt to bid in the auction, markups 
demanded and earned are higher than in the initial periods. The trends in the average markup 
graphs for both SCORE and NO-SCORE in Figure 4 substantiate this claim.  This result 
corresponds to higher and significant rent seeking in the auction in latter periods as 
established in the analysis of auction performance. Finally, the sign of the estimate for the 
Round variable is negative and significant (at 1%). This result indicates that a greater number 
of iterations within a period reduce markups.  
 
  The analysis of final round markups presented in this section provides valuable 
insight about subjects’ behavior at the end of the auction. Higher markup values for winners 
indicate that winners’ bids are above their costs and are significantly higher than losers’ who 
may have bid at costs and so cannot lower bids anymore. The relative magnitude of markups 
across winning and losing bidders provides support for the stability properties of the 
theoretically stable auction allocation.  Once this allocation is reached in the final round, none 
of the bidders have any incentive to deviate from their decisions and so the auction ends. The 
negative sign for the Learning variable also represents the rent seeking taking place for agents 
over time in these auctions. 
    
  
 
    
Figure 4 Markup in Final Round 
 
 
Dependent Variable : Markup over costs in Final Round of Period 
Dummy  .061** 
(0.163) 
Winner  0.179*   
(0.018) 
Learning (1/Period)  -0.094**   
(0.038) 
Final Round  -0.017* 
(.004) 
G1  -0.055*** 
(0.026) 
G2  -0.156* 
(.023) 
G3    -0.115*   
(0.022) 
Constant  0.324* 
(0.036) 
Number of Observation  846 
Number of Groups  72 
Unit of Observation  Individual Subject 
** represents estimate is significant at 5% level of significance 
* represents estimate is significant at 1% level of significance 
Table  6: Estimates (Standard Error) for Average Markup for Final Round 
  
 
    













































The dual objective of ecological and economic efficiency that needs to be pursued 
given fixed budgets has led to the development of an extensive literature on conservation 
auctions. A substantial portion of this research is devoted to the analysis of auctions for the 
achievement of various conservation goals in a laboratory setting. This paper considers the 
structure of an iterative auction for the selection of bids for projects adjacent to each other on 
a circular grid. The key result of the study is that auction performance is sensitive to 
information available to subjects and the value of costs and benefit associated with each 
project. When subjects have more information the economic performance of the auction 
suffers. However, there is no significant impact of the knowledge about auctioneer’s spatial 
objective conservation benefits produced in the auction.  Thus, added information serves to 
only make conservation units more expensive for the auctioneer. Second, the rent seeking and 
environmental effectiveness of the auction is significantly different across different parameter 
groups. Thus, CA implementation will lead to variable degrees of competition between 
participants and produce varying levels of performance in different landscapes, which have 
different cost benefit features and where different projects are pivotal. Finally the analysis of 
individual bid values across multiple auction periods indicate that at the end of the auction, 
bids submitted by both winners and losers are significantly different from their costs and that 
winners submit significantly higher bids than losers. This learning reflects the reality of 
conservation auction policy performance and is a matter of concern. The decrease in 
performance indicates that innovation in auction design for spatially contiguous land 
management is necessary to ensure that conservation units can be procured cheaply and that 
auctions can still perform cost efficient conservation land use procurement.  
 
The results of the current auction research add to the growing body of work focusing 
on the performance of auctions in various conservation settings. The auction structure is 
simple and similar to actual policy based CAs implemented in practice (such as the CRP 
auctions) so that results obtained can be directly translated to policy settings. While the study 
provides valuable insight about how the auction would fare in achieving spatial coordination, 
more complicated scenarios need to be considered for enhanced understanding of auctions in 
this spatial setting. Complicated and realistic scenarios can include the consideration of how 
collusive bidding will impact auction performance and when every bidder can submit 
multiple bids in a round.  
 
As threats for ES increase, incentive based mechanisms to promote voluntary 
conservation of natural resources is necessary. Additionally, with limited budgets, economic 
efficiency of the incentive mechanisms is a central objective. Thus, policy making needs to 
focus on mechanisms that target various ecological criteria. The current interest in both 
research and policy circles are to explicitly incorporate the spatial criterion into the auctions 
so that it can be attained in an economically efficient manner.  This paper contributes to this 
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